The Stylistics of Ethical Justification and Moral Reasoning

From the Viewpoint of Hakim Behabadi of Yazdi

Mohammad-Taghi Eslami;Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (ISCA) in Qom-Iran

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Today, applied ethicists introduce three methods of justification and reasoning to prove moral judgment: the top-down method, the bottom-up method, and the reflective equilibrium method.

The top-down method is a logical, deductive method. Deduction is the same method used in the mathematical sciences. In the deductive method, certain propositions contain premises. In this method, moral theories are expected to play the role of certain premises to prove moral judgments. But none of the moral theories can provide a certain predetermined structure to prove any moral judgment; a structure that can act like a mathematical rule in ethics and be equally applicable to all cases. The first problem with moral theories is that they are abstract and cannot cover all the objective and concrete details in a moral event. This problem has led many researchers in applied ethics to abandon the reference to ethical theories and to adopt an anti-theoretical approach and to turn to the bottom-up method.

The bottom-up method is a logical-inductive method. Logical-inductive method is the same method used in experimental science. Inductive reasoning consists of empirical premises, and its result is not certain. This method does not refer to a predetermined theory or theoretical structure. This method is completely based on the results obtained from the study of cases, and the verdict obtained as a result is completely partial, and the verdict of each case is different from another case. It is clear that if there is no previous theoretical structure to evaluate and measure the judgment of cases, and if the judgment of each case is completely subject to the conditions and contextual characteristics of that case, then we will never have an absolute moral judgment, and morality will always be relative. So the bottom-up method leads to the moral relativism. Moral relativism is a theory that has many problems.

Thus, the top-down method suffers from forms of abstraction, and the bottom-up method confronts us with moral relativism. What to do now, and what method to use? Is there a third way?

Here, thinkers have invented a third method that thinks about the thoughtful balance between high and low, that is, it thinks about multiplying the results of paying attention to moral theories according to the conditions and background characteristics of each specific case. This method is called moral principlism

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All moral principlists consider existing moral theories to be too abstract and therefore unworthy of central importance in moral reasoning, but none of them avoid these theories altogether. Some try to provide a correct interpretation of deontological or consequentialist theories, and some find it useful to combine and complement different theories. The result of this interpretation or combination is the integration and completion of moral principles. These principles, rather than moral theories, are the cornerstone of moral reasoning. Principles such as charity and justice.

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About the justification basis of moral principles: a group of principlists justify moral principles based on human reason and nature; This group pays little attention to the role of history, social contract, tradition, customs and the like in justifying moral principles. But another group of principlists consider the basis of the justification of moral principles to be "common morality" which pays basic attention to the role of history, social contract, tradition, customs and the like.

Now the question arises, where did we get these moral principles?

To answer this question, we inevitably enter into meta-ethical discussions about the meaning and justification of moral propositions. Philosophers such as William Frankena, in the theorizing of normative ethics, ultimately prove that their unbiased attempt to arrive at a relatively stable theory does not come to an end. In fact, this proof provides the basis for the hypothesis that even if moral propositions tell us about a reality, this reality is not a merely descriptive reality that can be obtained in the form of descriptive theories; rather, the recommending or guiding element in these propositions plays a central and consistent role.

If this hypothesis is proved, it turns out that the reasoning process for justifying moral propositions is fundamentally different from the reasoning process in other sciences; here we are dealing with a different kind of reasoning: if one base of this reasoning is based on a descriptive fact (and indicates what is), the other base must be based on a recommending fact (and indicates what ought to be). There is no logically productive relationship between descriptive facts and moral do's and don'ts: Between is and ought. Although we should not deny that other kinds of logical relations are in the place.

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Western moral philosophy and applied ethics texts (as far as the author has searched) have not addressed the question of the nature of such reasoning. However, Muslim sages and logicians, where they have discussed in detail the types of logical reasoning, have considered moral propositions such as the commonly accepted ones that constitute the premise of polemical reasoning. Polemical reasoning is reasoning based on facts or statements which are intended to oblige or inform the opponent. It should be noted that polemical reasoning is not a fallacy even if it is not an argument based on certainty (Burhan).

There has been a discussion among Muslim scholars about the evidential nature of moral issues, and some of them have believed that moral issues have not certain evidences, but rather they have special, commonly accepted ones (Mashhuorat Khasse). Perhaps it can be assumed that the thought of how to solve moral problems, as well as the challenges and deadlocks that existed in explaining and clarifying moral propositions based on general and total theories, led these scholars to this belief. Anyway, those who consider moral issues to have commonly accepted reasoning can show interest in case studies and contextualized approaches. While those who believe in the evidential nature of moral issues, if they do not reject case studies and contextualism, will at least look at them with caution.

Following the thought of Muslim scholars who have considered moral rules not from proofs, but from common knowledge, leads us to believe that their position is in fact in line with the answer to the question of the meaning and justification of moral propositions and rules, which is considered a meta-ethical discussion.

The theory of moderate moral recommendation is very close to the theory of these Muslim scholars. Although the discussion of applied ethics methods is in the field of normative ethics, not meta-ethics, it is necessary to discuss the meta-ethical principles that govern these methods. Adopting a recommendatory basis along with popular knowledge of ethical issues strengthens the evidence base for the use of case studies and reflective equilibrium.

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Muslim scholars often consider moral propositions to be special, and in this way they consider moral reasoning not in the line of argumentative arguments, but in the line of polemical arguments. This point is reflected in the logical works of the sages, especially in the topic of Sanaat Khams, which is devoted to the methodology of various types of logical arguments. It is surprising that this very important topic was neglected by the late logicians and according to Hakim Bahabadi in his comments on the book of Tahthib al Mantigh, the expression of the late scholars on this topic was infected by a disturbing brevity. This brevity and the neglect of accurate and precise elaboration have become an excuse for critics who have not made sufficient efforts to understand this topic, and have criticized the sages and logicians that the style of moral reasoning they have considered leads ethics to the abyss of relativism. While this criticism is not correct, and we can, inspired by the hints of sages such as Hakim Bahabadi, uncover the ambiguity of the stylistics of moral reasoning desired by Muslim sages and reveal the conclusion that the popularization of moral propositions not only has nothing to do with moral relativism, but it is in harmony with the reality of man's moral life. The discovery of this harmony and its application has brought fruitful results in the practical life and moral conduct of the sages whose lives we have in the biographies of Islamic scholars. Hakim Mulla Abdullah Bahabadi of Yazdi is one of the leaders of these sages.